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Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy began his remarks with a sobering assessment of the Taliban’s growing influence in Pakistan, noting that the question with which he titled his lecture, “Can the the Taliban win in Pakistan,” would have been “absurd” only a few years ago. “In 2004, no one had even heard of the Pakistani Taliban,” Hoodbhoy said. The situation has changed considerably since then, as indicated by a flurry of alarming headlines proclaiming the resurgence of the fundamentalist group in Pakistan. Hoodbhoy proceeded to outline the situation on the ground, where at least 4,000 Pakistanis have been killed in clashes between government forces and Taliban fighters. In North and South Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud’s operation has forced the Pakistani government to withdraw entirely, resulting in the closure of schools and hospitals. The Taliban have waged an especially harsh campaign to demolish girls’ schools, which have been bombed at a rate of two per week. Other repressive measures include a prohibition on tailors for women and punishment for men who do not grow beards. Hoodbhoy cited Swat as an example of a formerly peaceful district whose security and economy have suffered as a result of the Taliban’s incursion. Once sustained by thriving tourist and fishing industries, Swat’s economy has stagnated under the Taliban’s violent rule.

Hoodbhoy then outlined the Taliban’s primary objectives: the removal of secular institutions, the implementation of Shari‘a law, and the eradication of minority groups — primarily Pakistan’s Shi‘a and Christian communities. The Taliban is gradually transforming Pakistan’s political landscape by asserting authority in remote, tribal regions and using these spheres of influence as “stepping stones” to the country’s interior. According to Hoodbhoy, many Pakistanis are oblivious to the Taliban’s gradual encroachment, preoccupied as they are with the country’s faltering economy and rising living costs.

The Taliban’s activities conform to the conventional definition of insurgency warfare: an organized rebellion aimed at dismantling a government through the use of subversive tactics and armed conflict. “Their strategy is to inflict as much damage as possible upon the Pakistani troops and the establishment,” Hoodbhoy said. Numerous suicide bombings in Pakistani cities have rattled civilians as well as military personnel. Many Pakistani soldiers have surrendered rather than face the Taliban in combat. The Taliban have also exploited divisions between their allied opponents: the US, India, Afghanistan, and the Pakistani government. The July 7 suicide bombing at the Indian embassy in Kabul raised suspicions in Afghanistan and India that Pakistan was behind the attack, disrupting diplomatic relations between all three countries.

Pakistanis have become increasingly susceptible to fundamentalist ideology as a result of pervasive Islamist propaganda, which has inundated schools for two generations. Hoodbhoy showed slides of English and Arabic primers that teach the alphabet by associating letters with words. “A is for atom bomb. C is for collision,” Hoodbhoy read from one page, which depicted a flaming tower collapsing in the attacks on the World Trade Center. The influx of fundamentalist propaganda has been accompanied by another trend: the veiling of female university students and their absence altogether from many institutions of higher education.

In Hoodbhoy’s opinion, a Taliban takeover of Pakistan is a very real possibility. He offered a number of prescriptions for curtailing the Taliban’s rising influence. Foremost among these is the need to address the root causes of extremism, poverty, and deprivation, which render Pakistanis vulnerable to recruitment by the Taliban. Hoodbhoy also discouraged a common distinction that Pakistanis draw between “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban.” The former are idealized as virtuous opponents of Western influence and an antidote to government corruption — a misconception that blinds Pakistanis to the true brutality of the Taliban. Hoodbhoy also denounced the military’s preoccupation with acquiring nuclear weapons and other big “big ticket items” with which to counter India. He urged the military to direct its attention toward Pakistan’s internal threat by engaging in direct combat with Taliban militants. The Taliban cannot be neutralized through military action alone, Hoodbhoy stressed, recommending a combination of hard and soft power to ease the insurgency’s stranglehold on parts of Pakistan. He ended his remarks on a cautionary note, discouraging the United States from inferring in Pakistani politics: “Stop trying to choose our leaders for us. It gets people very angry.”